Police disperse 2,000 anti-dam protesters in western China
Posted By Christina Larson Friday, April 1, 2011 - 2:47 PM Share
"Now all the roads are cleared," a 30-year-old woman from the county of Suijiang, in China's southwest Yunnan province, told the Wall Street Journal. "There are military police patrolling the streets to avoid people gathering together." After five days of heated protests -- which had drawn 2,000 people to the streets -- a tense silence was being enforced. On Tuesday, 400 paramilitiary officers had descended on tiny Sujiang to disperse demonstrators.
The villagers had gathered to protest government plans to build a major hydropower station on the nearby Jinsha River. Approximately 60,000 people are slated to be relocated by the dam, but many villagers either don't qualify for government compensation -- or feel that the amount offered is far too low to replace their lost livelihoods.
Over the next decade, expect many more dams to be built in China, as the country seeks to meet rapidly growing energy needs. As Peter Bosshard wrote recently in FP, China's National Energy Administration is likely to soon approve further hydropower projects totaling 140 gigawatts -- in comparison, he notes, "the United States has installed just 80 gigawatts of hydropower capacity in its entire history."
Protests over land seizures and low compensation are not uncommon in rural China. (More than 50,000 such "public disturbances" are counted by public security bureaus each year.) But the recent Sujiang demonstration attracted particular national attention, in part because snapshots (see above) of paramilitary forces arriving in armoured personnel carriers were distributed widely through Sina Weibo -- a popular Twitter-like microblogging site that remains accessible in China, for now.
Tuesday, April 19, 2011
Monday, April 11, 2011
Friday, April 8, 2011
Poem
This poem is from the Star Wars: Revenge of the Sith novel. I am putting it on the blog because it truely shows the nature of the struggle for human rights. Please take it seriously and read it too the end. If you dont read it to the end, you wont get the point of the poem.
The dark is generous.
Its first gift is concealment: our true faces lie in the dark beneath our skins, our true hearts remain shadowed deeper still. But the greatest concealment lies not in protecting our secret truths, but in hiding from us the truth of others.
The dark protects us from what we dare not know.
Its second gift is comforting illusion: the case of gentle dreams in nights embrace, the beauty that imagination brings to what would repel in day's harsh light. But the greatest of its comforts is the illusion that the dark is temporary: that every night brings a new day. Because it is day that is temporary.
Day is the illusion.
Its third gift is the light itself: as days are defined by the nights that divide them, as stars are defined by the infinite black through which they wheel, the the dark embraces the light, and brings it forth from the center of its own self.
Which each victory of the light, it is the dark the wins."
"The dark is generous, and it is patient, and it always wins.
It always wins because it is everywhere.
It is in the wood that burns in your hearth, and in the kettle on the fire; it is under your chair and under your table and under the sheets on your bed. Walk in the midday sun and the dark is with you, attached to the soles of your feet. The brightest light casts the darkest shadow."
"The dark is generous, and it is patient, and it always wins-but in the heart of its strength lies weakness: one lone candle is enough to hold it back.
Love is more than a candle.
Love can ignite the stars."
I have also placed a video, at the bottom of the post, of the poem if you would just like to listen to it.
The dark is generous.
Its first gift is concealment: our true faces lie in the dark beneath our skins, our true hearts remain shadowed deeper still. But the greatest concealment lies not in protecting our secret truths, but in hiding from us the truth of others.
The dark protects us from what we dare not know.
Its second gift is comforting illusion: the case of gentle dreams in nights embrace, the beauty that imagination brings to what would repel in day's harsh light. But the greatest of its comforts is the illusion that the dark is temporary: that every night brings a new day. Because it is day that is temporary.
Day is the illusion.
Its third gift is the light itself: as days are defined by the nights that divide them, as stars are defined by the infinite black through which they wheel, the the dark embraces the light, and brings it forth from the center of its own self.
Which each victory of the light, it is the dark the wins."
"The dark is generous, and it is patient, and it always wins.
It always wins because it is everywhere.
It is in the wood that burns in your hearth, and in the kettle on the fire; it is under your chair and under your table and under the sheets on your bed. Walk in the midday sun and the dark is with you, attached to the soles of your feet. The brightest light casts the darkest shadow."
"The dark is generous, and it is patient, and it always wins-but in the heart of its strength lies weakness: one lone candle is enough to hold it back.
Love is more than a candle.
Love can ignite the stars."
I have also placed a video, at the bottom of the post, of the poem if you would just like to listen to it.
Wednesday, April 6, 2011
Missing Before Action
Due to the revolutions in the Middle East, the Chinese government has been detaining prominent human right activists and lawyers to ensure that they do not rebel. Here is a list of a few
1.Over the weekend, the prominent Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, who has been vocal about human rights abuses in China, was detained at Beijing Capital Airport.
2.Another blogger and activist targeted by police is 31-year-old Gu Chuan, a signer of Charter 08 and a protégé of Liu Xiaobo. Gu was taken from his home by police on Feb. 19 and has not been heard from for more than 40 days. During this time, police have visited his wife, who is nursing a baby and taking care of a toddler, to pressure her to urge her husband to quit activism. She has refused. Following orders from the police, her landlord has recently canceled her lease, leaving the family in dire straights.
3. Ran Yunfei, a prolific 46-year-old writer and signer of the pro-democracy tract Charter 08, has been held in detention since Feb. 20
4.) Tang Jitian, a human rights lawyer, was taken away by police on the evening of Feb. 16. He had just eaten lunch with a dozen other activists who were discussing how to provide assistance to the blind activist Chen Guangcheng, now under house arrest in Shandong province. Tang's residence was searched.
5. Hua Chunhui, 47, is a cyberactivist and midlevel manager at an insurance company in eastern Jiangsu province. He was seized by police on Feb. 21 and detained on suspicion of "endangering state security." Hua, using the Twitter account @wxhch64, has tweeted messages about the "Jasmine Revolution." Hua and his fiancée Wang Yi have been active in civil society initiatives in recent years
1.Over the weekend, the prominent Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, who has been vocal about human rights abuses in China, was detained at Beijing Capital Airport.
2.Another blogger and activist targeted by police is 31-year-old Gu Chuan, a signer of Charter 08 and a protégé of Liu Xiaobo. Gu was taken from his home by police on Feb. 19 and has not been heard from for more than 40 days. During this time, police have visited his wife, who is nursing a baby and taking care of a toddler, to pressure her to urge her husband to quit activism. She has refused. Following orders from the police, her landlord has recently canceled her lease, leaving the family in dire straights.
3. Ran Yunfei, a prolific 46-year-old writer and signer of the pro-democracy tract Charter 08, has been held in detention since Feb. 20
4.) Tang Jitian, a human rights lawyer, was taken away by police on the evening of Feb. 16. He had just eaten lunch with a dozen other activists who were discussing how to provide assistance to the blind activist Chen Guangcheng, now under house arrest in Shandong province. Tang's residence was searched.
5. Hua Chunhui, 47, is a cyberactivist and midlevel manager at an insurance company in eastern Jiangsu province. He was seized by police on Feb. 21 and detained on suspicion of "endangering state security." Hua, using the Twitter account @wxhch64, has tweeted messages about the "Jasmine Revolution." Hua and his fiancée Wang Yi have been active in civil society initiatives in recent years
Monday, March 28, 2011
Is Talking to Beijing a Waste of Time
Original source
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/12/is_talking_to_beijing_about_human_rights_a_waste_of_time?page=full
Why aren't human rights activists who work on China more enthusiastic about the upcoming meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials on the critical topic of human rights? The discussions, to begin in Washington on May 13, are the first human rights dialogue between the two countries since May 2008 and the first to be hosted by President Barack Obama's administration. Yet expectations that the meetings will produce any meaningful change, or even a clear set of goals, are remarkably low.
It's of course natural to have low hopes for a human rights dialogue with China, given how bad its record on the issue is. In the last month alone, we've observed two important nongovernmental organizations paralyzed by government interference. The Women's Legal Research and Services Center, China's leading women's legal rights organization, was abruptly deregistered by Beijing University, leaving it in legal limbo. And Wan Yanhai, one of China's most prominent HIV/AIDS activists, went into self-exile in the United States last weekend, stating sensibly enough, "It was no fun waiting to be attacked by government agencies all the time."
As part of a continuing attack on rights lawyers, Tang Jitian and Liu Wei joined the growing ranks of lawyers stripped of their licenses for daring to take on "sensitive" cases, further emasculating China's fledgling "rights protection" movement. And Gao Zhisheng, another courageous activist who chose to take the government at its word and tried to make use of the legal system to redress common grievances, has been disappeared -- for a second time.
But the problem isn't just China -- it's also the way the talks are structured. The dialogue process lacks meaningful benchmarks for progress, or consequences for failing to improve the situation. The Chinese government doesn't send representatives with appropriate authority or experience to participate meaningfully in the dialogues, neither does it come with any concrete plans for reform. Chinese officials often spend their visit just trying to run out the clock.
Given how ineffective the dialogues have been -- and how ineffective similar talks held by other countries with China have also been -- they also create a risk of excluding other potentially more fruitful avenues for human rights discussion, such as having cabinet members raise an issue or case, or having senior government officials speak publicly and in more detail about those discussions. The current talks may also be used as an excuse for sidelining human rights from important talks that we know the Chinese government does care about, such as the upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
However, assuming that the dialogues will continue and assuming that the Chinese government will continue to filibuster and avoid real issues, how should the Obama administration use the sessions to its best advantage in bringing about real improvements for the Chinese people?
First, the administration should visibly and publicly commit to raising human rights issues outside the dialogue. I can already hear the Obama administration's rebuttal: "We regularly raise human rights issues at the highest levels, and in frank terms." But if the private language matches the public rhetoric, it's hardly the kind of precise, concrete questioning the Chinese government needs to hear. We need to hear agencies other than the State Department talk to their Chinese counterparts about human rights issues. For example, the agencies sponsoring rule-of-law projects in China should speak out publicly about China's practice of disbarring lawyers, which makes a mockery of these rule of law initiatives.
If the administration wants to claim a "whole of government" approach to promoting human rights in China, diverse officials and agencies must better coordinate their outreach. In July 2009, the Commerce Department and the U.S. trade representative (USTR) publicly opposed the Chinese government's proposal to mandate filtering software on all personal computers. The Commerce Department and the USTR described the software not only as a barrier to trade, but also as a threat to the right to expression. Such assessments should be a regular feature of U.S. diplomacy with China.
Second, the administration must do a better job outside these talks of not undermining its stated commitment to human rights. We're glad not to have heard anything akin to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's February 2009 comments that human rights "can't interfere" in the bilateral relationship, but we continue to hear too many public comments from U.S. officials about the United States and China "agreeing to disagree" on human rights. Comments like this make it easy for the Chinese government to choose the rhetoric that it prefers, and, after all, if the administration does go into these exercises with no expectation of rapprochement, why have a dialogue at all?
Finally, the United States can -- and definitely should -- do a better job of standing publicly on key human rights issues with other like-minded countries. There have been a few significant moments of solidarity, particularly the image of a few dozen staff members from rights-supporting embassies in Beijing standing on courthouse steps awaiting verdicts handed down to prominent government critics.
Too often the United States and the dozen other countries that conduct human rights dialogues with the Chinese government opt not to act together, citing the Chinese government's intense dislike of being "ganged up on" by the West. But these governments, which often express virtually identical views on identical topics to the Chinese government in private, need to stand together in public, if for no other reason than to show the stark differences between their systems and Beijing's. Human rights standards are universal, and sometimes solidarity -- and diplomacy -- needs to be, too.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/12/is_talking_to_beijing_about_human_rights_a_waste_of_time?page=full
Why aren't human rights activists who work on China more enthusiastic about the upcoming meetings between U.S. and Chinese officials on the critical topic of human rights? The discussions, to begin in Washington on May 13, are the first human rights dialogue between the two countries since May 2008 and the first to be hosted by President Barack Obama's administration. Yet expectations that the meetings will produce any meaningful change, or even a clear set of goals, are remarkably low.
It's of course natural to have low hopes for a human rights dialogue with China, given how bad its record on the issue is. In the last month alone, we've observed two important nongovernmental organizations paralyzed by government interference. The Women's Legal Research and Services Center, China's leading women's legal rights organization, was abruptly deregistered by Beijing University, leaving it in legal limbo. And Wan Yanhai, one of China's most prominent HIV/AIDS activists, went into self-exile in the United States last weekend, stating sensibly enough, "It was no fun waiting to be attacked by government agencies all the time."
As part of a continuing attack on rights lawyers, Tang Jitian and Liu Wei joined the growing ranks of lawyers stripped of their licenses for daring to take on "sensitive" cases, further emasculating China's fledgling "rights protection" movement. And Gao Zhisheng, another courageous activist who chose to take the government at its word and tried to make use of the legal system to redress common grievances, has been disappeared -- for a second time.
But the problem isn't just China -- it's also the way the talks are structured. The dialogue process lacks meaningful benchmarks for progress, or consequences for failing to improve the situation. The Chinese government doesn't send representatives with appropriate authority or experience to participate meaningfully in the dialogues, neither does it come with any concrete plans for reform. Chinese officials often spend their visit just trying to run out the clock.
Given how ineffective the dialogues have been -- and how ineffective similar talks held by other countries with China have also been -- they also create a risk of excluding other potentially more fruitful avenues for human rights discussion, such as having cabinet members raise an issue or case, or having senior government officials speak publicly and in more detail about those discussions. The current talks may also be used as an excuse for sidelining human rights from important talks that we know the Chinese government does care about, such as the upcoming U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
However, assuming that the dialogues will continue and assuming that the Chinese government will continue to filibuster and avoid real issues, how should the Obama administration use the sessions to its best advantage in bringing about real improvements for the Chinese people?
First, the administration should visibly and publicly commit to raising human rights issues outside the dialogue. I can already hear the Obama administration's rebuttal: "We regularly raise human rights issues at the highest levels, and in frank terms." But if the private language matches the public rhetoric, it's hardly the kind of precise, concrete questioning the Chinese government needs to hear. We need to hear agencies other than the State Department talk to their Chinese counterparts about human rights issues. For example, the agencies sponsoring rule-of-law projects in China should speak out publicly about China's practice of disbarring lawyers, which makes a mockery of these rule of law initiatives.
If the administration wants to claim a "whole of government" approach to promoting human rights in China, diverse officials and agencies must better coordinate their outreach. In July 2009, the Commerce Department and the U.S. trade representative (USTR) publicly opposed the Chinese government's proposal to mandate filtering software on all personal computers. The Commerce Department and the USTR described the software not only as a barrier to trade, but also as a threat to the right to expression. Such assessments should be a regular feature of U.S. diplomacy with China.
Second, the administration must do a better job outside these talks of not undermining its stated commitment to human rights. We're glad not to have heard anything akin to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's February 2009 comments that human rights "can't interfere" in the bilateral relationship, but we continue to hear too many public comments from U.S. officials about the United States and China "agreeing to disagree" on human rights. Comments like this make it easy for the Chinese government to choose the rhetoric that it prefers, and, after all, if the administration does go into these exercises with no expectation of rapprochement, why have a dialogue at all?
Finally, the United States can -- and definitely should -- do a better job of standing publicly on key human rights issues with other like-minded countries. There have been a few significant moments of solidarity, particularly the image of a few dozen staff members from rights-supporting embassies in Beijing standing on courthouse steps awaiting verdicts handed down to prominent government critics.
Too often the United States and the dozen other countries that conduct human rights dialogues with the Chinese government opt not to act together, citing the Chinese government's intense dislike of being "ganged up on" by the West. But these governments, which often express virtually identical views on identical topics to the Chinese government in private, need to stand together in public, if for no other reason than to show the stark differences between their systems and Beijing's. Human rights standards are universal, and sometimes solidarity -- and diplomacy -- needs to be, too.
Think Again: Human Rights
A article that clears up some of the misconceptions about human rights. The article is from the magazine Foreign Policy which is a magazine that every news buff should read daily. There are several pages to this article I am only posting some of it. Please go to the original source if you would like to read the full article.
Original source
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/think_again_human_rights
"All Persons and Peoples Aspire to the Same Human Rights"
No. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be formally accepted around the world, but its generalized framework allows for almost limitless interpretations. Even the supposed global consensus on, say, the prohibition of torture as a "human wrong" is deceptive: In the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the prominent U.S. legal scholar Alan Dershowitz argued in favor of legalized torture as a counterterror measure.
If anything, the postcolonial period since the writing of the declaration has witnessed an erosion of the belief in the universality of human aspirations. In part, this erosion stems from a widespread conviction that human rights are a Western invention being shoved down non-Western throats. Though such attitudes are partly a propaganda ploy by leaders who seek to shield their abusive behavior from criticism, they also reflect the views of many non-Westerners who believe that the highly individualistic declaration does not adequately balance rights with responsibilities -- witness the emergence of "Asian Values" or "Islamic Values."
The assertion of value-based and cultural variations also represents a regional backlash against the unwanted aspects of globalization, including the fear of U.S. dominance and related concerns about consumerism and the loss of tradition. One important way to establish regional identity has been to emphasize the distinctiveness of human rights, whether Asian or African, Islamic or Christian. Another example of this trend has been the greater prominence of representatives of indigenous peoples' rights. Their sense of difference is so strong that, operating under U.N. auspices, a worldwide network of indigenous representatives is developing its own framework for human rights, known as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Even unity on human rights within the West is overrated. There is an important mainstream confusion in thought about international human rights that arises from their dual origins within the Western experience of the late 18th century. From the French Revolution, with its affirmation of the "Rights of Man" (liberty, equality, and fraternity), arises a sense of universality, that all persons by virtue of being human have certain common entitlements that transcend the specifics of context. In contrast, from the American Revolution comes the Bill of Rights, appended to the U.S. Constitution, applicable only to the United States, and subject to interpretation by domestic courts, which themselves are depositories of national values and evolving policy priorities. The ongoing friction between the United States and Europe on such issues as capital punishment and the relevance of international law can be partly explained by important differences in outlook that evolved from this dual revolutionary heritage.
"Human Rights Abuses Worsened Worldwide After September 11, 2001"
Yes, but not for most Iraqis and Afghans. Especially in the United States, the enactment of antiterror laws has raised genuine concerns about restrictions on human rights. Governments in nations such as Israel, Russia, Pakistan, and Egypt have seized upon the terrorist issue as a pretext for intensifying the repression of national opposition movements and individuals. And the U.S. preoccupation with security concerns and alliance relations has also taken precedence over human rights, especially in U.S. dealings with critical frontline states such as Pakistan as well as several highly authoritarian Central Asian countries.
But those losses must be set against some important gains. The pressure to respond to the al Qaeda challenge, and to pursue U.S. geopolitical goals, led to wars that produced regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had two of the worst governments in the world from the human rights perspective. True, millions of people in both countries must confront the prospect of civil strife in the years ahead, accompanied by some risk that cruel forms of authoritarianism will reemerge. Yet, for the moment at least, they are much better off than they were -- even if respecting the prohibitions of international law on the use of force remains more important than military intervention to promote human rights around the world.
"Human Rights Abuses in One Country Can Justify Military Intervention by Others"
Yes. This issue arose in the 1990s in relation to genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and failed states elsewhere in Africa. The international community faced a nasty dilemma: Either abandon populations to humanitarian catastrophe, or override the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty to rescue them. The U.N. record was mixed at best. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who bears some responsibility for the widely criticized U.N. non-response to the unfolding Rwandan genocide of 1994, later made amends by urging the United Nations to balance its respect for sovereignty against its duty to protect vulnerable populations.
The duty of the international community to act now seems clear, not least because of greater global awareness of human rights emergencies. But such action is hampered by a weakness of political will on the part of Security Council members. This weakness arises from two sources: a reluctance by some members, including the United States, to endow the United Nations with sufficient capabilities to be effective, and the unwillingness of others, most notably China and Russia, to erode sovereign rights. There is great suspicion among developing nations, especially in Asia, that claims of humanitarian intervention are concealed ways for former colonial powers and the West generally to override their countries' political independence. Although history lends credence to these concerns, if the facts demonstrate an impending humanitarian catastrophe and enough political will exists to provide real protection or help, then the world community should act even if it means the erosion of sovereignty.
The policy issue is more difficult. In the case of Kosovo, for example, the U.N. Security Council could not reach consensus, despite the evidence that another instance of Balkan ethnic cleansing was likely imminent. The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo rescued the Albanian Kosovar population from catastrophe, but at the expense of international law governing the use of force. Unlike the Iraq intervention of 2003, however, a regional consensus supported the action taken in Kosovo and the facts validated the moral claim of urgency. As such, while the intervention may have been illegal, it was politically and morally legitimate. This gap is not desirable, but it is better than ignoring principles altogether or adopting a rigid posture of unconditional nonintervention.
Original source
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/think_again_human_rights
"All Persons and Peoples Aspire to the Same Human Rights"
No. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be formally accepted around the world, but its generalized framework allows for almost limitless interpretations. Even the supposed global consensus on, say, the prohibition of torture as a "human wrong" is deceptive: In the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the prominent U.S. legal scholar Alan Dershowitz argued in favor of legalized torture as a counterterror measure.
If anything, the postcolonial period since the writing of the declaration has witnessed an erosion of the belief in the universality of human aspirations. In part, this erosion stems from a widespread conviction that human rights are a Western invention being shoved down non-Western throats. Though such attitudes are partly a propaganda ploy by leaders who seek to shield their abusive behavior from criticism, they also reflect the views of many non-Westerners who believe that the highly individualistic declaration does not adequately balance rights with responsibilities -- witness the emergence of "Asian Values" or "Islamic Values."
The assertion of value-based and cultural variations also represents a regional backlash against the unwanted aspects of globalization, including the fear of U.S. dominance and related concerns about consumerism and the loss of tradition. One important way to establish regional identity has been to emphasize the distinctiveness of human rights, whether Asian or African, Islamic or Christian. Another example of this trend has been the greater prominence of representatives of indigenous peoples' rights. Their sense of difference is so strong that, operating under U.N. auspices, a worldwide network of indigenous representatives is developing its own framework for human rights, known as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Even unity on human rights within the West is overrated. There is an important mainstream confusion in thought about international human rights that arises from their dual origins within the Western experience of the late 18th century. From the French Revolution, with its affirmation of the "Rights of Man" (liberty, equality, and fraternity), arises a sense of universality, that all persons by virtue of being human have certain common entitlements that transcend the specifics of context. In contrast, from the American Revolution comes the Bill of Rights, appended to the U.S. Constitution, applicable only to the United States, and subject to interpretation by domestic courts, which themselves are depositories of national values and evolving policy priorities. The ongoing friction between the United States and Europe on such issues as capital punishment and the relevance of international law can be partly explained by important differences in outlook that evolved from this dual revolutionary heritage.
"Human Rights Abuses Worsened Worldwide After September 11, 2001"
Yes, but not for most Iraqis and Afghans. Especially in the United States, the enactment of antiterror laws has raised genuine concerns about restrictions on human rights. Governments in nations such as Israel, Russia, Pakistan, and Egypt have seized upon the terrorist issue as a pretext for intensifying the repression of national opposition movements and individuals. And the U.S. preoccupation with security concerns and alliance relations has also taken precedence over human rights, especially in U.S. dealings with critical frontline states such as Pakistan as well as several highly authoritarian Central Asian countries.
But those losses must be set against some important gains. The pressure to respond to the al Qaeda challenge, and to pursue U.S. geopolitical goals, led to wars that produced regime changes in Afghanistan and Iraq, which had two of the worst governments in the world from the human rights perspective. True, millions of people in both countries must confront the prospect of civil strife in the years ahead, accompanied by some risk that cruel forms of authoritarianism will reemerge. Yet, for the moment at least, they are much better off than they were -- even if respecting the prohibitions of international law on the use of force remains more important than military intervention to promote human rights around the world.
"Human Rights Abuses in One Country Can Justify Military Intervention by Others"
Yes. This issue arose in the 1990s in relation to genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and failed states elsewhere in Africa. The international community faced a nasty dilemma: Either abandon populations to humanitarian catastrophe, or override the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty to rescue them. The U.N. record was mixed at best. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who bears some responsibility for the widely criticized U.N. non-response to the unfolding Rwandan genocide of 1994, later made amends by urging the United Nations to balance its respect for sovereignty against its duty to protect vulnerable populations.
The duty of the international community to act now seems clear, not least because of greater global awareness of human rights emergencies. But such action is hampered by a weakness of political will on the part of Security Council members. This weakness arises from two sources: a reluctance by some members, including the United States, to endow the United Nations with sufficient capabilities to be effective, and the unwillingness of others, most notably China and Russia, to erode sovereign rights. There is great suspicion among developing nations, especially in Asia, that claims of humanitarian intervention are concealed ways for former colonial powers and the West generally to override their countries' political independence. Although history lends credence to these concerns, if the facts demonstrate an impending humanitarian catastrophe and enough political will exists to provide real protection or help, then the world community should act even if it means the erosion of sovereignty.
The policy issue is more difficult. In the case of Kosovo, for example, the U.N. Security Council could not reach consensus, despite the evidence that another instance of Balkan ethnic cleansing was likely imminent. The 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo rescued the Albanian Kosovar population from catastrophe, but at the expense of international law governing the use of force. Unlike the Iraq intervention of 2003, however, a regional consensus supported the action taken in Kosovo and the facts validated the moral claim of urgency. As such, while the intervention may have been illegal, it was politically and morally legitimate. This gap is not desirable, but it is better than ignoring principles altogether or adopting a rigid posture of unconditional nonintervention.
Profile: Liu Xiaobo
When Liu Xiaobo learned of his 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, he wept and told his wife -- who was visiting him in remote Jinzhou prison, where the dissident writer has been serving an 11-year sentence -- that he was dedicating the award to "the lost souls" of Tiananmen Square, whose protest back in 1989 turned the soft-spoken professor into a political activist.
Liu had agreed to help write Charter 08, a manifesto for Chinese civil rights modeled on the Soviet-era Charter 77, in a similar act of selflessness, knowing it would get him in trouble. Two days before its publication, on Dec. 8, 2008, he was detained and thrown into a windowless cell. A year later he was convicted of "incitement to subvert state power."
It wasn't the first time Liu had been jailed; his first confinement followed his participation in the Tiananmen demonstrations. Yet more than two decades of suffering have not broken his spirit or blurred his convictions. "To block freedom of speech is to trample on human rights, to strangle humanity, and to suppress the truth," Liu told the court before his sentencing.
China's state media have characterized the Nobel only as a tool of Western propagandists, and live feeds of CNN and the BBC went black during the prize's announcement. But the word is getting out, and it's not just the Nobel Peace Prize committee that thinks China will eventually have to reckon with Liu's ideas.
Link to original source
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/29/the_fp_top_100_global_thinkers?page=0,15
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